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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
DIEGO ARROYO, #05-B-2056,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2013-0170.45
INDEX # 2013-343
ORI #NY016015J

-againstNYS BOARD OF PAROLE,

Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Diego Arroyo, verified on April 3, 2013 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on April 19, 2013. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the Bare
Hill Correctional Facility, is challenging the February, 2012 determination denying him
parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court issued an
Order to Show Cause on April 23, 2013 and has received and reviewed respondent’s
Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified on July 12, 2013 and
supported by the July 12, 2013 Letter Memorandum of Hilary D. Rogers, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General. No Reply has been received from petitioner.
On May 23, 2002 petitioner was apparently sentenced in Supreme Court, New
York County, to an indeterminate sentence of 3½ years to life upon his conviction of the
crime of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance 2°. After completing the DOCCS Shock
Incarceration Program petitioner was released to parole supervision in January of 2003.
Upon a delinquency in December of 2003 petitioner was revoked and restored to the
Willard Drug Treatment program prior to being re-released to community-based parole
supervision. Petitioner committed a new criminal offense in March of 2005 and on July 7,
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2005 he was sentenced in Supreme Court, Oneida County, to a determinate term of 8
years, with 5 years post-release supervision, upon his conviction of the crime of Criminal
Possession of a Controlled Substance 1°.1
Petitioner made his initial post-2005 sentencing appearance before a Parole Board
on February 7, 2012. Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying him
parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The parole denial
determination reads as follow:
“PAROLE DENIED. AFTER A PERSONAL INTERVIEW, RECORD
REVIEW AND DELIBERATION, THIS PANEL FINDS YOUR RELEASE IS
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE.
REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED,
INCLUDING YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY, REHABILITATION
EFFORTS, AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY
REINTEGRATION.
YOUR INSTANT OFFENSE OF CPCS 1ST OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE
ON PAROLE SUPERVISION.
CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO YOUR DENIAL OF AN EARNED
ELIGIBILITY AND RECEIPT OF MULTIPLE DISCIPLINARY
VIOLATIONS DURING THIS TERM.
DUE TO YOUR POOR RECORD ON PAROLE AND POOR COMPLIANCE
WITH DOCCS RULES, YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS DENIED.
THERE IS REASONABLE PROBABILITY YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND
REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeals from the parole denial
determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on July 18, 2012. A
decision on administrative appeal upholding the February 2012 parole denial
determination was rendered on or about February 25, 2013. This proceeding ensued.

1

Petitioner was originally sentenced to a determinate term of 8 years without mention of the period
of post-release supervision. He was re-sentenced on January 26, 2011, however, to the same 8-year
determinate term but with a 5-year period of post-release supervision specified.
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Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Petitioner, incorporating by reference his brief on administrative appeal, advances
several arguments in support of his ultimate contention that the February 2012 parole
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denial determination must be vacated. The Court is most concerned at this juncture with
petitioner’s claim that the Parole Board “ . . . relied almost entirely on the instant offense
and criminal history to deny parole. There was no future focused risk assessment that the
new amendments to Executive Law [§259-c(4)] require.” That statute was amended by
L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b, effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New
York State Board of Parole shall “. . . establish written procedures for its use in making
parole decisions as required by law. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and
needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the
likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board
of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”2
Since petitioner does not specifically challenge the implementation procedures put
into effect by the board of Parole in response to the amendment to Executive Law §259c(4), such issue will not be addressed in this Decision and Judgment. The Court
nevertheless notes that the Appellate Division, Third Department, has repeatedly
overturned parole denial determinations based upon the Board’s failure to utilize
COMPAS risk and needs assessment instruments in connection with post-September 2011
parole release hearings. See Linares v. Evans, ___ AD3d ___, 2013 NY Slip Op 08189,
Malerba v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067 and Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830. In reaching its
decision in Linares, the Appellate Division, Third Department, found as follows:
“Petitioner is entitled to a new parole hearing due to the Board’s failure to
use a ‘COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment’ instrument, which is a
document created and intended to bring the Board into compliance with the
recent amendments to Executive Law §259-c(4).” (Citations omitted).
2

Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
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In the absence of any indication in the record that a COMPAS risk and needs
assessment instrument was utilized in connection with petitioner’s February 7, 2012
Parole Board appearance and the ensuing parole denial determination, this Court finds
the decisions of the Appellate Division, Third Department in Linares, Malerba and
Garfield to be dispositive and, therefore, further finds that the parole denial
determination in the case at bar must be overturned with a de novo hearing ordered. In
view of this result, the Court finds no need to address petitioner’s remaining causes of
action.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is granted, without costs and disbursements, but
only to the extent that the February 2012 parole denial determination is overturned and
the matter remanded for de novo parole release consideration, before a different Parole
Board, within 45 days of the date of this Decision and Judgment, in a manner not
inconsistent with this Decision and Judgment.

Dated:

December 9, 2013 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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